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Abstract 
This tutorial briefly outlines the conceptual background to acceptance and commitment 
therapy (ACT) and its early connection to the study of derived stimulus relations. The paper 
then provides an overview of how complex clinical behavior can be understood and 
manipulated in the areas where these connections exist. Specifically, the paper outlines four 
key areas of connection, and how these can be used to understand and treat aspects of human 
psychological suffering: transformation of functions; rule-governed behavior; relating 
relations and analogy; and the deictic stimulus relations and the verbal self. Finally, the 
article then briefly outlines a new framework for conceptualizing the dynamic interactions 
among derived stimulus relations and the potential implications this holds for ACT.  
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Acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT; Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999) has 
been identified as a modern behavior therapy with a substantive body of supporting evidence 
that includes over 200 randomized controlled trials (RCTs). ACT has been linked directly to 
relational frame theory (RFT; Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001), a behavior-analytic 
account of human language and cognition that relies on the concept of derived stimulus 
relations. RFT also has a growing body of empirical evidence (Barnes-Holmes, Finn, 
McEnteggart, & Barnes-Holmes, 2018; O'Connor, Farrell, Munnelly, & McHugh, 2017). The 
basic idea behind both RFT and ACT is that the evolution of human language, conceptualized 
as derived relational responding, creates a type of psychological suffering that is largely 
unique to humans. RFT constitutes the basic theory behind this assertion and ACT, as a 
clinical intervention, is designed to deal with the psychological problems that human 
language creates for our species (Törneke, 2010; Villatte, Villatte, & Hayes, 2015). 
The current paper aims to provide a tutorial on the links between ACT and derived 
stimulus relations, particularly through the lens of RFT. Although RFT is sometimes seen as 
providing the basic behavioral science underpinning ACT, it is perhaps more accurate to say 
that they co-evolved. RFT did not give rise directly to ACT, and nor did ACT backward 
engineer RFT, but as will be shown the two are interrelated. The current tutorial thus aims to 
articulate links between the theory and the application, and to show how RFT suggests 
functional-analytic ways in which clinically relevant behavior can be understood and 
manipulated. The paper will first describe the conceptual background to ACT, followed by an 
overview of four key areas in which RFT clearly links to ACT (and potentially other forms of 
psychotherapy). These areas include: transformations of function; rule-governed behavior; 
relating relations and analogy; and the verbal self. The paper will then briefly outline a recent 
conceptual development within RFT and how this also may connect with ACT. 
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Acceptance and Commitment Therapy: Conceptual Background and its Early 
Connection to the Study of Derived Stimulus Relations 
As noted above, ACT and the study of derived relations (in terms of RFT) did not 
emerge in a linear sequence (e.g., first RFT then ACT) but co-evolved. Early in the history of 
ACT (and RFT) it could be argued that the connection between the two was relatively clear, 
at least in some key areas. However, ACT quickly grew in popularity and the need for a 
model for training clinicians, and for presenting ACT to verbal communities not well versed 
in behavior analysis (let alone derived relations research and RFT), quickly became apparent. 
This led to the development of the psychological flexibility model, called the hexaflex (for an 
explanation, see Hayes, Luoma, Bond, Masuda, & Lillis, 2006). Although the development of 
this model had benefits in terms of supporting dissemination and clinical utility, it also made 
the connections between ACT and RFT increasingly unclear (see Barnes-Holmes, Hussey, 
McEnteggart, Barnes-Holmes, & Foody, 2016, for a detailed discussion). The current article 
suggests, however, that connections remain and indeed it may be possible to develop and 
refine them within the context of conceptual developments in RFT that may emerge over the 
coming years. The potential advantages of maintaining those links between the basic science 
and application remain to be determined, but it seems important to do so with the increasing 
emphasis that is being placed on basic processes in evaluating the impact and value of 
psychotherapy generally. 
Historically, one of the first steps towards a contextual approach to psychological 
therapy was made by applied behavior analysts who used consequential and discriminative 
stimulus control to change social behavior (Baer, Wolf, & Risley, 1968). Specifically, 
functional assessments were used to identify the contextual variables that exerted stimulus 
and consequential control over specific target behaviors. These contextual variables could 
then be used to bring about desired behavior change. When these variables were approached 
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in less contextually sensitive and sophisticated ways, the technology transformed into what 
has sometimes been referred to as behavior modification, in which the role of consequences 
to change behavior overshadowed functional assessment (Hayes, Rincover, & Solnick, 1980; 
Zettle, 2016). The importance of functional assessment re-emerged, however, when 
researchers returned to a more contextual approach to challenging behaviors, particularly 
within the domain of developmental disabilities (Carr, 1994; Carr, 1977; Hanley, Iwata, & 
McCord, 2003; Iwata Dorsey, Slifer, Bauman, & Richman, 1982; Luiselli & Cameron, 1998; 
O’Neill, Horner, Albin, Story, & Sprague, 1990). Despite the success of this approach within 
developmental disabilities, it has been argued that applied behavior analysis remained limited 
in its ability to deal with the complexities of clinical phenomena among verbally 
sophisticated adults (Dymond & Alonso‐Álvarez, 2010; Dymond, O’Hora, Whelan, & 
O’Donovan, 2006; Friman, 2006; Hayes, 2001). 
It might be suggested that the relatively narrow focus of applied behavior analysis on 
developmental disabilities facilitated the emergence of cognitive behavior therapy (CBT; 
Beck, 1976) as a way of dealing with verbally sophisticated individuals. As part of the so-
called cognitive revolution, CBT was very much focused on mediating cognitive or mental 
events that were used to explain “pathological” behavior. For example, CBT used the concept 
of cognitive control to describe how cognitions (i.e., thoughts or schemata) control actions 
and thus cause emotional and behavioral problems (Zettle, 1990). This view highlighted the 
role of human language and cognition in human psychological suffering, but with a very 
strong focus on mental representations and processes to guide psychotherapy. As such, an 
emphasis on the environment, or an individual’s history of experience within that 
environment, seemed to become less important, at least in terms of generating explanatory 
concepts. Put simply, from the cognitive perspective, individuals who suffered 
psychologically were deemed to have abnormal cognitions, dysfunctional schemata, or 
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inappropriate appraisals. The “problem” thus lay within the mind of the individual and not in 
the interaction of the individual with their environment. Or to put it bluntly, minds were seen 
to be “sick” or “dysfunctional,” with less attention to the problematic environments in which 
individuals lived.  
ACT could be seen as an attempt within the behavior-analytic tradition to develop a 
therapy that was contextually and behaviorally focused, but which also recognized the pivotal 
role that human language and cognition play in psychological suffering1. An early behavior-
analytic attempt to grapple with language and cognition employed a concept first proposed in 
the mid-1960s, that of instructional control or rule-governed behavior (Skinner, 1966). 
Specifically, Skinner (1969) defined rules as contingency-specifying stimuli -- “we tend to 
follow rules because previous behavior in response to similar verbal stimuli has been 
reinforced” (p. 148). And indeed, from the beginning ACT emphasized excessive rule-
following as a source of human suffering. One method that was developed to deal with 
excessive rule-following was called cognitive distancing2, defined as the ability to observe or 
“step back” from thoughts and feelings (Zettle & Hayes, 1983). That is, from a behavior-
analytic perspective, clients were taught to observe or simply notice problematic rules that 
had been used to guide behavior, and engage more directly with the contingencies of 
reinforcement in the natural environment (Zettle, 2016).  
It is important to note that early ACT drew heavily on the concept of rule-governed 
behavior at a time when this type of behavior was attracting considerable attention in the 
basic science of behavior analysis (see Hayes, 1989 for an extensive review). Despite the 
                                                          
1 It is worth noting that ACT was developed initially for largely clinical purposes, but given its roots in a 
functional analysis of human language and cognition, it has been expanded to cover a wide range of applied 
contexts. For example, ACT has been used in organizational psychology (e.g., Bond, Hayes, & Barnes-Holmes, 
2006), the treatment of epilepsy (e.g., Lundgren, Dahl, & Hayes, 2008), palliative care (e.g., Feros, Lane, 
Ciarrochi, & Blackledge, 2013), stigmatization and prejudice (e.g., Lillis & Hayes, 2007), and parenting 
children with intellectual disabilities (e.g., Burke et al., 2014). 
2 Labeled in early ACT literature as comprehensive distancing. 
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body of literature that emerged up until this point, no precise functional-analytic definition of 
instructional control or rule-governed behavior had been offered. More precisely, Skinner had 
argued that rules specify reinforcement contingencies, but the functional definition of 
specification itself had remained ill-defined. A functional-analytic definition of specification, 
however, was provided in part by Sidman’s seminal body work on stimulus equivalence (e.g., 
1971). In brief, equivalence relations were defined by the emergence of matching behaviors 
that could not be explained by direct reinforcement contingencies, or other well-established 
behavioral principles. For example, a child who was taught to match a spoken word to an 
object, and a spoken word to a printed word, was able to spontaneously match the printed 
word to the object, without any further reinforcement (see Sidman, 1994). Sidman proposed 
that the formation of such equivalence relations may provide a behavior-analytic 
interpretation of semantic meaning in human language. In so doing, it could be argued that 
Sidman provided the much-needed definition of specification that was missing in the early 
behavioral literature on rule-governed behavior.  
While Sidman’s work on equivalence relations focused on what may be considered 
the most basic type of symbolic relation, Steven Hayes and colleagues subsequently proposed 
that equivalence responding may be interpreted as a type of generalized operant behavior, and 
that many such operants (referred to as relational frames) could be identified within natural 
human language. Thus, for example, children not only learned to relate arbitrary stimuli as 
participating in equivalence relations, but also acquired other relational operants, such as 
coordination, opposition, distinction, comparison, spatial frames, temporal frames, deictic 
relations, and hierarchical relations (see Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2016a, for a recent 
review). The concept of the relational frame as a generalized relational operant has acquired 
increasing support, and seems to provide a functional-analytic way of defining and studying 
rule-governed behavior.   
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According to RFT, a rule or instruction is typically composed of a network of frames 
of equivalence and temporal relations. Broadly speaking, the equivalence relations serve to 
specify the events in the relevant contingency, with the temporal relations coordinating the 
rule with the contingency itself. Thus, for example, the simple rule “When the green light 
comes on, then go” involves a series of derived equivalence relations between each word in 
the rule and the event to which it refers, with specific words in the rule such as “when” and 
“then” functioning as contextual cues for temporal relations. In this case, the rule specifies 
“green light first, go second”.  
 In apparently resolving the conceptual question of how rules specify contingencies, 
RFT pushed the more basic concept of derived relations center-stage in terms of dealing with 
human psychological suffering. Early ACT, therefore, started with a very strong focus on 
rule-governed behavior and the problems it created for psychological suffering (e.g., resulting 
in the view that suffering involved excessive rule-following), but in grappling with the 
concept of rule-governed behavior itself, the role of derived relations in human suffering 
became increasingly apparent. Perhaps the clearest example of this was the concept of the 
transformation of functions that is central to RFT.   
Transformations of Functions 
Transformation of functions has often been invoked in the clinical domain to explain 
the development and maintenance of irrational fears and phobias (e.g., Augustson & 
Dougher, 1997; Dougher, Augustson, Markham, Greenway, & Wulfert, 1994). To illustrate, 
consider a simple example of an early, relatively minor traumatic event. Imagine a boy who 
went horse riding for the first time and experienced a bad fall from the horse and 
subsequently started to fear horses. In this case, the fear of horses could be considered 
directly conditioned. Now imagine that the boy spontaneously develops a fear of riding his 
bicycle, even though he has not experienced a fall while doing so. Such a transfer of aversive 
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or fear functions could be based, at least in part on the fact that horses and bicycles 
participate in a frame of equivalence or coordination in the context of “things you ride.” 
Because of this coordination, over time it is possible that the boy may avoid learning to ride a 
motorcycle or perhaps even drive a car because these all enter into an equivalence frame of 
“modes of transport” that may lead to injury. 
The transformation of functions can also be used to explain increasingly complex 
examples of psychological suffering. For instance, the ability to relate entire relational 
networks to other relational networks may be involved in highly abstract transformations of 
functions. To illustrate, imagine a woman who has recently begun to feel trapped in a number 
of areas of her life (e.g., work, relationships, and family responsibilities). The use of the word 
“trapped” in these contexts of her life results in bouts of claustrophobia and panic when she is 
required to enter enclosed spaces, including elevators, subways, and crowded shopping areas. 
The emergence of claustrophobia and panic may have little to do with actual aversive 
experiences in any of these contexts, but is based on the transformation of functions of those 
contexts, because they are coordinated via the term “trapped” to the relational networks that 
describe work, relationships, and family responsibilities.  
When human psychological suffering is interpreted or explained in terms of derived 
relations and the derived transformation of functions, this highlights the importance of 
focusing on the role of language during the process of therapy. In the case of the woman who 
developed claustrophobia and panic in the context of feeling trapped in several domains in 
her life, it may be useful in therapy to explore the word “trapped” itself. For example, in 
exploring the functional properties of “trapped,” the therapist might literally hold the client’s 
wrists gently and ask her to describe how it feels to be trapped by someone else. Engaging in 
this physical metaphor may help the client to see the connections between her 
claustrophobia/panic and the wider unhappy features of her life, and to then explore her 
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reactions to these in ways that in terms of ACT are defined as values-driven3, rather than 
values-disabling (e.g., consider changing jobs, sharing her fears with her partner, etc.).   
Rule-governed Behavior 
In recognizing that the concept of the transformation of functions may help to explain 
certain features of human psychological suffering, the role of rules in such suffering was seen 
in a fresh light. Of course, we learn to follow rules from an early age and this provides us 
with useful strategies for controlling our own behavior and predicting the behavior of others. 
For example, parents pass on rules to their children about poisonous foods, such as raw meats 
(e.g., if chicken is undercooked it can make you sick), so they can avoid serious illness 
without making direct contact with the natural contingencies. According to the ACT 
literature, rule-governed behavior may also create behaviors that are insensitive to 
contingencies, such that it helps to promote psychological suffering rather than protecting us 
from potentially harmful events in the natural environment. Indeed, many researchers have 
proposed that persistent rule-following and the insensitivity effect may help to explain 
specific clinical behaviors (McAuliffe, Hughes, & Barnes-Holmes, 2014, p. 2). According to 
ACT, therefore, excessive reliance upon multiple rules in day-to-day life can become 
problematic. Consider, for example a man who attempts to follow these types of rules: “I 
must always be strong;” “I can’t let my guard down;” “People can never see me upset;” “Men 
shouldn’t get upset;”, and so forth. Following such rules may indeed work well in his 
professional life, because he is the leader of a team with certain expectations for masculine 
behavior. However, in a different context of life, such as his relationship with his partner, 
following these rules excessively becomes problematic because he never talks about things 
that upset him or appear to make him vulnerable, which, in turn, detracts from intimacy. 
                                                          
3 Meaning, in essence, focusing on behaviors that create contact with highly-valued positive reinforcers. Values-
disabling actions do the opposite. 
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In the context of therapy, ACT employs various interventions to undermine excessive 
rule-following. The therapist does this by helping the client to identify exemplars of rule-
following and by exploring, in ACT terms, the workability of the rule in various contexts 
(i.e., the consequences of following the rule). For example, using the previous example, the 
therapist identifies the rule “People can never see me upset” as controlling the client’s 
behavior. To identify the extent of the control of the rule, the therapist might ask questions 
such as “Can you give me some examples of when you might use this rule?” The therapist 
can then begin to target the behavioral control functions of the rule by asking questions such 
as “Is it possible that living according to this rule might have actually pushed your partner 
away from you?” These questions can offer the client an alternative, or in terms of ACT, a 
defused perspective from which to view their own behavior in the context of the rule. The 
therapist might then try to encourage the client to engage in alternative contingency-sensitive 
behaviors (rather than rule-consistent behaviors), such as shaping up the behavior of talking 
to his partner about his feelings through successive approximations. For example, the client 
might first be encouraged to share with his partner when he had a bad day, and over time he 
might be encouraged to be able to cry in front of his partner if he feels the need to. 
Relating Relations and Analogy 
The previous section highlights how rules, as networks of derived stimulus relations, 
have been used to understand and treat human psychological suffering within ACT. Another 
area in which the study of derived relations has been closely tied to ACT is in developing a 
RFT account of analogical reasoning and metaphor. According to RFT, relating derived 
relations lies at the root of analogies and metaphors (Stewart & Barnes-Holmes, 2001). To 
illustrate this basic account, let us consider the simple analogy of “peach is to pear as cat is to 
dog,” in which one coordination relation is related to another coordination relation. One 
coordination relation relates two stimuli in the context of fruit and the other coordination 
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relation relates the stimuli in the context of domestic animals. The phrase “is to” relates the 
two relations as coordinate with each other. Critically, the four stimuli (peach, pear, cat, dog) 
do not collapse into a single relational network in which they all become equivalent or 
coordinate. Rather, the network consists of two separate relations that are related to each 
other as relations.  
One of the key functions of analogy and metaphor in natural language is to help 
listeners to use established knowledge in one domain to help understand an event or 
information in another domain. The classic Rutherfordian analogy in which the structure of 
atoms was likened to planets orbiting the sun provides one example in the context of science. 
Relating relations, as the basis of analogy and metaphor, has also been used to help clients to 
see their psychological suffering in new or different ways that may facilitate clinical change 
(see Foody et al., 2014). To illustrate, let’s consider one of ACT’s stock analogies, 
“struggling with anxiety is like struggling in quicksand.” This example contains the relevant 
elements: (1) two coordination4 relations (struggling with anxiety-panic and struggling in 
quicksand-drowning); (2) a coordination relation between these relations (struggling with 
anxiety is like struggling in quicksand); and (3) seeing the behavior of “struggling” as part of 
the problem. More technically, the analogy is designed so that the functions of struggling in 
quicksand transfer to struggling with anxiety through the coordination-coordination relation. 
Put simply, the analogy suggests that there is something about struggling with anxiety that, 
from the therapist’s perspective, is similar to struggling in quicksand. Specifically, the urge to 
struggle to escape quicksand typically leads to more rapid drowning, just as struggling with 
anxiety may lead to the rapid onset of a full-blown panic attack. This type of analogy could 
be useful in therapy if a client had not previously seen that attempts to struggle to control 
                                                          
4 For the purposes of this example, these are described as coordination relations, which are simple relational 
networks, and once these networks are expanded within the context of therapy, the networks become more 
complex. Thus, we will use the terms relations and networks almost interchangeably. 
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anxiety might actually increase the likelihood of descending into panic. Asking the client to 
consider the analogy, or relate stimulus relations in this way, may thus encourage the client to 
respond differently to the experience of anxiety when it occurs. Relating relations, in the 
context of this analogy, thus suggests that it may be useful to expose oneself to anxiety, in 
much the same way as one survives in quicksand by lying relatively still and not struggling.  
An important caveat to the use of relating relations in therapy is that it occurs in the 
wider context of the therapist conducting a functional assessment of the client’s situation. In 
other words, the therapist needs to identify the client’s key problem. For example, if the 
client’s anxiety does not include a sense of struggling to breathe, then the coordination with 
drowning in quicksand will likely not work. Similarly, if a client has never heard of 
quicksand, then there is no point in trying to construct a relational network around this. 
Critically, the closer the analogy matches the relevant relational networks for the client, the 
more likely it is that the appropriate behavioral change (in this case, transformation of 
functions for the word “struggle”) will occur for the client. 
Deictic Stimulus Relations and the Verbal Self 
Skinner (1974) first referred to self-awareness as produced by social contingencies 
that reinforce the discrimination of one’s own behavior, out of which the sense of self 
becomes abstracted (see also Dymond & Barnes 1997). The emergence of a stable sense of 
self is a critical feature of human development and an assumed prerequisite for complex 
verbal behavior and psychological wellbeing (Dymond & Barnes 1997; Hayes 1984). And 
clinical researchers have often argued that a fractured or deviant development of the self can 
be associated with psychological suffering (e.g., Ingram 1990; McEnteggart, Barnes-Holmes, 
Dillon, Egger, & Oliver, 2017). For RFT, a verbal self involves three functionally distinct 
deictic relational units: the interpersonal I-YOU relations; the spatial HERE-THERE 
relations; and the temporal NOW-THEN relations (Barnes-Holmes, 2001). The basic idea is 
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that the verbal community gradually teaches a young child to distinguish him- or herself from 
others and to locate this verbal self in both space and time. For example, young children are 
frequently asked, by care-givers, questions such as: “what are you doing now?” “what did 
you do then?” “where are you going tomorrow?” and “did you go there with your dad or your 
mom?” As a child learns to respond appropriately to these questions, the verbal self, located 
in time and place and in relation to others, emerges in the behavioral repertoire.  
It has been argued that the verbal self (sometimes referred to as the deictic-I) appears 
to be central to psychological suffering (e.g., Barnes-Holmes et al., 2017). From an RFT 
perspective, this suffering may emerge when the verbal self participates in certain instances 
of excessive rule-following. For example, the rule or relational network “Only bad people 
end up alone” may help to create a negative evaluation of the verbal self following a divorce 
or the death of a spouse. More technically, the excessive rule-following produces a 
transformation of negative evaluative functions of the self based on coordinating the verbal 
self with “alone” and “alone” with “badness.” In ACT, this effect may be referred to as fusion 
with negative thoughts and feelings about the self. Critically, these negative evaluations of 
the self, as instances of excessive rule-following, by definition, reduce the likelihood that 
behaviors will be emitted that could bring the individual into contact with reinforcement 
contingencies that would undermine the problematic rule-following. For example, engaging 
in new social activities, following a divorce may be less likely if the individual believes that 
they deserve to be alone because they are a bad person and not worth loving.  
One way in which ACT tackles this type of fusion or excessive rule-following is to 
help the client appreciate that verbal rules are simply rules and in a sense the verbal self is 
free to choose whether or not to follow them. The aim here is not to challenge the 
problematic rule itself, but to highlight that the verbal self is separate or distinct from any rule 
or relational network in which the self may participate. Indeed, in ACT, certain metaphors or 
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analogies are sometimes used to make this point. For example, one common metaphor 
involves suggesting that the verbal self is like a chessboard upon which the black and white 
pieces represent negative and positive rules or evaluations about the self. In this metaphor, 
the board provides a context for the rules but is separate from them (the chessboard metaphor 
is sometimes referred to as a self-as-context exercise in the ACT literature). The aim here is 
to undermine excessive rule-following, which may limit or reduce a client’s contact with 
potential reinforcers in the natural environment. 
 The relationship between the verbal self and others. The development of the 
relationship between the verbal self and others also appears to be critical in the emergence of 
certain instances of psychological suffering (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2017; McEnteggart et al., 
2017). Imagine a young boy who is subject to physical and emotional abuse by a parent over 
a period of years. The parent would often abuse the child in one moment and then, in the 
next, say “You know that I love you.” The fact that the parent emits relational networks or 
rules pertaining to the child’s verbal self (i.e., that he is loved) in a way that is incoherent 
with how the wider verbal community responds to such networks (most people do not 
routinely abuse people they love) may undermine the child’s ability to connect in a healthy 
way with others in adulthood. That is, the child may find it challenging in later life to form a 
close and intimate relationship with someone who is not abusive towards him in some way. 
In extreme cases, the levels of relational incoherence that are created by highly abusive 
parenting may alter the development of a coherent or stable verbal self, resulting in severe 
psychological manifestations such as hearing voices, dissociation or paranoia (McEnteggart 
et al., 2017).  
 When confronted with such extreme cases of psychological trauma, an ACT therapist 
may focus extensively on the therapeutic relationship as a means of attempting to establish a 
more coherent verbal self for the client. This is typically achieved by creating an intensely 
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cooperative environment in which the therapist provides a verbal environment devoid of the 
incoherent relational networks that characterized the client’s early family experiences. In a 
sense, the therapist aims to construct a relationally coherent and stable verbal sense of self for 
the client that failed to emerge due to abusive parenting. This can be extremely challenging 
work for a therapist (and indeed the client) because it may involve contacting relatively 
aversive functions for both individuals during the course of therapy. For example, a therapist 
might say “I can almost feel how painful that would have been for you, if I were in your 
shoes, I would find it very difficult to trust that someone really loves me now.”  This sharing 
of potentially aversive relational networks pertaining to the impact of an abusive history is 
likely critical for successful therapeutic outcomes in such extreme cases. 
A New Framework in Relational Frame Theory and its 
Implications for Acceptance and Commitment Therapy 
The preceding is a quick survey of historical connections between concepts in RFT 
and ACT. The present section will briefly consider some implications for ACT of a new 
framework within RFT that emphasizes the potentially dynamic nature of derived relational 
responding. This development may help to reconnect RFT more directly with ACT, and 
specifically with the types of clinical phenomena that arise in therapy. The framework is 
referred to as the multi-dimensional multi-level framework (MDML; see Barnes-Holmes et 
al., 2018, in the current volume for diagram summarizing the framework). According to the 
MDML, there are five levels of relational responding: mutual entailing (bidirectional relation 
between two stimuli); relational framing (simplest relational network); relational networking; 
relating relations; and relating relational networks. The framework conceptualizes each of 
these levels as having four dimensions: derivation, complexity, coherence, and flexibility. 
Each level intersects with each dimension yielding 20 units of analysis for conceptualizing 
the dynamics of relational responding (see Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Luciano, & 
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McEnteggart, in press, for a detailed treatment of the MDML). In brief, derivation refers to 
how many times a derived response has been emitted - the first response is, by definition, 
high in derivation because it derived entirely from a trained relation(s). Subsequently, 
however, derived responses gradually acquire their own history and thus are less and less 
derived from the initially trained relation(s). Complexity refers to the detail or density of a 
pattern of relational responding, such as the number of relations and/or different types of 
relations in a given network. Coherence refers to the extent to which relational responding is 
generally predictable or consistent with previously established patterns of relational 
responding (whether directly trained and/or derived). Flexibility refers to the extent to which 
patterns of derived relational responding may be altered or impacted upon by various 
contextual variables (e.g., how readily a pattern of equivalence responding may change when 
the trained baseline relations are reversed). 
To appreciate how the MDML serves to emphasize the dynamics that may emerge in 
studying derived relational responding in basic experimental research, the reader should 
consult Barnes-Holmes et al. (in press). For present purposes, however, consider instead how 
the MDML connects to clinically relevant phenomena. Imagine a client who comes into 
therapy and during the first session initiates this interaction.  
Client: I am a terrible person.  
Therapist: Do you really believe this?  
Client: Without a doubt, I truly am terrible to the bone.  
Therapist: How long have you thought this?  
Client: As long as I can remember. 
Therapist: Why do you think you are so terrible? 
Client: I don’t know really, I just am.  
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Therapist: That’s funny you say that because you don’t seem like a 
terrible person to me. 
Client (aggressively): But you don’t even know me yet, when you do, 
you’ll see how terrible I really am. 
How might we conceptualize this therapeutic exchange in terms of the MDML? First, 
when the client says, “I am a terrible person,” this may be defined as mutually entailing the 
verbal self with “terrible.” Second, when the client states, “Without a doubt, I truly am 
terrible to the bone,” the mutual entailing may be defined as high in coherence (i.e., it is 
highly consistent with the client’s other self-descriptive statements). Third, when the client 
reports thinking this for “As long as I can remember,” the mutually entailing is defined as 
low in derivation (i.e., the client has been thinking this almost habitually). Fourth, when the 
client says “I just am” as an explanation for being terrible, the mutual entailing is defined as 
relatively simple (low in complexity) at that point in the therapeutic exchange. Finally, when 
the client reacts negatively to the therapist’s suggestion that the client does not seem like a 
terrible person, the mutually entailing may be defined as highly inflexible.  
The MDML can be used to conceptualize relatively subtle differences in the type of 
therapeutic exchange presented above. Imagine, for example, that the client provided a long 
list of reasons for qualifying as terrible (rather than simply saying, “I just am”). For example: 
“I’m divorced, my kids don’t talk to me, I drink too much, I don’t work hard and think I 
might get fired, and when my mom died last year I was too drunk to attend the funeral.” This 
“reason-giving” might be better categorized as relational networking or even relating 
relational networks. In terms of dimensions, the client’s responding might be defined as low 
in coherence if the response to the therapist’s question, “Do you really believe this?” was, “I 
mean I think I am, I do try to be a better person though.” If the client indicated having only 
recently self-identified as a terrible person (rather than thinking this for years), the network 
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might be considered relatively high in derivation (i.e., as a verbal response that had only 
emerged recently in the client’s verbal repertoire). Because the client replied with a long list 
of reasons why they are terrible, the networking may be defined as high in complexity. When 
challenged by the therapist, had the client replied with, “maybe you’re right, my sister says 
the same thing to me,” this may indicate a higher level of flexibility than that presented in the 
example above.  
Using the MDML in the assessment of clinically relevant behavior may well have 
direct implications for the type of clinical action a therapist takes. As a brief example, 
consider the different MDML interpretations of the “I’m terrible” statement outlined above. 
In the first instance, the statement was interpreted as simple mutual entailing that was low in 
complexity, high in coherence, low in derivation, and low in flexibility. In the second 
instance, the statement was interpreted as reason-giving or relational networking that was 
high in complexity, low in coherence, high in derivation, and high in flexibility. In the first 
instance, the therapist might focus directly on the word “terrible” with a view to undermining 
coherence and increasing flexibility. For example, a word repetition exercise (sometimes 
referred to as defusion) in which the word “terrible” is repeated over and over would likely 
serve to undermine the transfer of “terrible” functions to the self. In other words, the exercise 
would help the client to see that labeling themselves as “terrible” does not mean that they 
actually are terrible. In the second instance, instead of focusing on the word “terrible” itself, 
the therapist would instead focus on the entire relational network as an example of reason-
giving that always leads to distress or tension. For example, the therapist might say 
something like “It seems that if you looked hard enough, you could find just as many reasons 
why you’re not terrible, as you could find reasons why you are terrible. Just as a little 
exercise, why don’t you give me some reasons why you are not terrible.” The critical point 
here would not be to dispute the original “terrible” network, but to illustrate to the client that 
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this reason-giving is somewhat arbitrary, and as such the client is encouraged to consider the 
functions that such reason-giving has for them.    
At the time of writing, the MDML was relatively new in the literature on derived 
relational responding and thus it remains to be seen how much it impacts upon ACT, as 
practiced in the clinic. Nevertheless, it seemed useful to present this recent development here 
because it illustrates how there are ongoing efforts to connect the study of derived stimulus 
relations with ACT, and therapy in general. 
Conclusions 
 The primary aim of this article was to present a brief tutorial on ACT, as seen through 
the lens of derived stimulus relations, and RFT in particular. As noted at the beginning of the 
current article, the relationship between ACT and RFT appeared relatively direct in the early 
years of both research programs, but there was an undeniable drift between the two, which 
made it increasingly difficult to see how ACT was rooted firmly in the basic science concepts 
surrounding the study of derived stimulus relations. Nevertheless, connections do remain, and 
it is possible that the MDML and other conceptual developments in RFT may help to further 
strengthen and clarify these connections. Focusing on these connections will be important for 
the basic science in terms of maintaining its pragmatic utility, and equally important for the 
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